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Change and Continuity in Fringe Benefit Taxation: Seeking Sense and Sensibility
I.	Introduction

One of the most central issues in the income taxation of individuals is the treatment
of so-called “fringe benefits.” This loosely defined phrase includes everything from
employer-provided health insurance to discounts on an employer’s products to retirement
planning services funded by one’s present employer. Indeed, the most recent Employer’s
Guide to this subject from the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) includes the following
examples: health benefits, achievement awards, adoption assistance, athletic facilities,
dependent care assistance, educational assistance, employee discounts, employee stock
options, employer-provided cell phones, group-term life insurance coverage, lodging on
employer business premises, meals, moving expense reimbursements, no-additional-cost
services, retirement planning services, transportation (commuting) benefits, tuition
reduction, and working condition benefits.1
The basic allure of fringe benefits results from a fundamental discrepancy in
their tax treatment vis-à-vis wages and other cash compensation. Wages are included
in the taxable income of employees and are deductible as a business expense by
employers. While the cost of providing fringe benefits is similarly deductible by
employers, the value of such benefits is often excluded from the taxable income of
employees.2 This anomalous result persists despite the explicit inclusion of “fringe
benefits” in the Internal Revenue Code’s (IRC) foundational definition of gross
income3 because various exceptions have been created for reasons ranging from
avoiding wartime limits on compensation to encouraging energy conservation.4 As a
result of this disparate tax treatment, fringe benefits have increased in both popularity
and cost, and today represent a much larger proportion of employee compensation
than was the case a half century ago.5
This phenomenon of excluding certain fringe benefits from taxation raises several
distinct issues for tax reform generally and for understanding the metastatic profusion
of tax administrative complexity specifically. One such issue is cost. The exclusion of
fringe benefits from employees’ income reduced federal income tax revenues by
nearly $381 billion in fiscal year 2011, representing more than a third of the forgone
tax revenues that are often described as “tax expenditures.”6 Moreover, many of these
fringe benefit exclusions carry over to the definition of income that state governments
1.

Employer’s Tax Guide to Fringe Benefits: For Use in 2014, Internal Revenue Serv. 5 (Dec. 4, 2013),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p15b.pdf; Treas. Reg. § 1.61-21(a)(1) (Westlaw 2012).

2.

See, e.g., I.R.C. § 106 (Westlaw 2010); id. § 119 (Westlaw 1998); id. § 132 (Westlaw 2013).

3.

Id. § 61(a)(1) (Westlaw 1984).

4.

See, e.g., id. § 132(f)(1)(A), (B), (D), (f)(5)(A), (B), (F); see also Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and
Economic Growth: The Treasury Department Report to the President, 2 U.S. Dep’t Treasury 1, 36
(1984), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/taxpolicy/Documents/tres84v2All.pdf.

5.

See Ken McDonnell, Finances of Employee Benefits: Health Costs Drive Changing Trends, 26 Emp.
Benefits Res. Inst. Notes 2, 2–3 (Dec. 2005), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/notespdf/EBRI_
Notes_12-20055.pdf.

6.

Facts from EBRI, Tax Expenditures and Employee Benefits: Estimates from the FY 2011 Budget, Emp.
Benefits Res. Inst. 1 (Mar. 2010), available at http://www.ebri.org/pdf/publications/facts/FS-209_
Mar10_Bens-Rev-Loss.pdf.
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employ in determining their own income tax base.7 Furthermore, many fringe benefit
exclusions, including employer-provided health insurance,8 also apply well to Social
Security’s definition of wages,9 thereby reducing tax receipts for that program—an
issue of increasing importance as the Baby Boom generation begins to claim
retirement benefits.
Another major issue that fringe benefit treatment necessarily implicates is
fairness. Some fringe benefits tend to be widely available to employees of varying
economic status.10 But others, such as first-class air transportation, are generally
concentrated among the economic elite within any given business organization.11 In
other cases, a particular fringe benefit—say, food and lodging provided for the
convenience of the employer—manifests itself very differently in different contexts.
Few taxpayers find anything untoward, for example, when McDonald’s workers are
able to consume their McWhatevers at work without owing any McTax on their
value, but well-paid art museum directors living rent-free in high-priced housing is
another matter entirely. Perhaps that is why The New York Times deemed it
newsworthy in 2010 to report that the president of the American Museum of Natural
History owed no income tax on her rent-free use of a $5 million apartment the
museum purchased when she was hired.12 Similar arrangements applied to the
director of the Metropolitan Museum of Art’s $4 million co-operative apartment
and the director of the Museum of Modern Art’s $6 million condominium.13
Another fundamental issue raised by the exclusion of fringe benefits from taxation
is economic efficiency. Goods and services provided as excludable fringes are worth
more to employees than taxable forms of compensation because no tax is owed on
those goods and services.14 This absence of tax cost increases the appeal of non-cash

7.

Jerome R. Hellerstein & Walter Hellerstein, State and Local Taxation: Cases and
Materials 888 (7th ed. 2001) (“Most state personal income taxes conform closely to the federal
personal income tax.”).

8.

I.R.C. § 106 (Westlaw 2010); id. § 3121(a)(2) (Westlaw 2008).

9.

Compare id. § 3121(a), with 42 U.S.C.A. § 409 (Westlaw 2008). See Maureen B. Cavanaugh, On the
Road to Incoherence: Congress, Economics, and Taxes, 49 UCLA L. Rev. 685, 702–03 (2002).

10.

See Susan R. Finneran, Fringe Benefit or “Condition of Employment”: Uniformity, Certainty, and
Compliance, 78 Nw. U. L. Rev. 198, 198–99 (1983).

11.

See, e.g., Christopher Falkenberg & Shira Zatcoff, Employer-Provided Security and the Independent
Security Study, 112 Tax Notes 583, 583 (2006) (“Many corporations provide their senior executives
with cars, drivers, and access to private aircraft.”).

12.

Kevin Flynn & Stephanie Strom, Fine Perk for Museum Chiefs: Luxury Housing (It’s Tax-Free), N.Y.
Times (Aug. 10, 2010), http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C07EEDF1330F933A2575B
C0A9669D8B63. See generally Jane Zhao, Nights on the Museum: Should Free Housing Provided to Museum
Directors Also Be Tax-Free?, 62 Syracuse L. Rev. 427 (2012).

13.

Flynn & Strom, supra note 12.

14.

See Robert W. Turner, A Variety of Forms of Compensation that are Not Taxed, in NTA Encyclopedia of
Tax’n & Tax Pol’y 159, 160–61 (Joseph J. Cordes et al. eds., 2d ed. 2005), available at http://www.
taxpolicycenter.org/taxtopics/encyclopedia/Fringe-Benefits.cfm.
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compensation,15 incentivizing employees to prefer such benefits even when they might
not do so otherwise. If all forms of compensation were taxed equally, many employees
would likely reject fringe benefits in favor of cash income over which they would have
greater control. They could then purchase the goods and services they prefer at prices
that would more accurately reflect the demand for them.16 In this manner, excluding
fringe benefits from taxation reduces tax neutrality and creates economic inefficiency.17
This article examines the expansion of excludible fringe benefits that has
characterized the long history of the federal income tax with a view to returning to
first principles of general income inclusion, as propounded in § 61. However, full
taxation of all fringe benefits glosses over important distinctions. Accordingly, the
ultimate goal is to distinguish between fringe benefits that employers provide primarily
for their own business purposes, which are appropriately excluded from an employee’s
taxable income, and fringe benefits that substitute for essentially personal expenditures
made by an employer on an employee’s behalf, which should not be so excluded.
Part II of this article examines the history of fringe benefits and the IRS’s
struggle to create a consistent framework for analyzing fringe benefit exclusions. Part
II also demonstrates that the present confusion pervading the fringe benefit area is
largely due to the use of varying theories and justifications for excluding fringe
benefits that make no pretense of advancing historical tax policy objectives and are
often outdated as well. Part III proposes a more straightforward framework to apply
to existing and future fringe benefits by arguing that fringe benefits should be
excluded from taxation only if they are necessary for employees to complete their
duties or are required for closely calibrated administrability concerns. This framework
is then applied to the more significant fringe benefit exclusions of the present IRC.
II.	Historical Development of Fringe Benefit Exclusion

A. Pre-Statutory Administrative Determinations

The term “fringe benefit” did not appear in Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary
until 1961,18 but the concept of excluding certain employer-provided benefits from
gross income has existed since the earliest days of the federal income tax. The
Revenue Act of 1913 (“Revenue Act”) provided that taxable net income “shall include
gains, profits, and income derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal
service of whatever kind and in whatever form paid . . . also from interest, rent,
dividends, securities . . . or gains or profits and income derived from any source
15.

See id.; see also Julie A. Roin, United They Stand, Divided They Fall: Public Choice Theory and the Tax
Code, 74 Cornell L. Rev. 62, 62 (1988).

16.

See, e.g., Clark C. Havighurst, The Backlash Against Managed Health Care: Hard Politics Make Bad Policy,
34 Ind. L. Rev. 395, 399 (2001).

17.

See generally Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth: The Treasury Department Report to
the President, 1 U.S. Dep’t Treasury 1, 13 (1984), available at http://www.treasury.gov/resourcecenter/
taxpolicy/Documents/tres84v1All.pdf.

18.

Wayne M. Gazur, Assessing Internal Revenue Code Section 132 After Twenty Years, 25 Va. Tax Rev. 977,
981 n.14 (2006).
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whatever.”19 Despite the broad scope of this language, the IRS quickly began creating
nonstatutory exclusions to this provision. By 1921, the IRS had issued administrative
decisions excluding from taxable income certain employer-provided meals and
lodging, 20 employee death benefits, 21 group-term life insurance payments, 22 and rail
passes provided to off-duty railroad employees and their families. 23
Inconsistent application of these exclusions quickly turned fringe benefits into an
area of immense confusion and escalating complexity.24 With little available in terms of
concrete rules, the IRS made subsequent exclusion decisions based on analogy, custom,
and so-called “common sense.”25 Reliance on these techniques resulted in a gradual
broadening of fringe benefit exclusions, a result inconsistent with the Revenue Act’s
general purpose of collecting income from “any source whatever.”26 This process is
illustrated in the following specific contexts: meals and lodging, health and accident
insurance, group-term life insurance, transportation passes, and holiday gifts.
		

1. Convenience of the Employer: Meals and Lodging

The IRS’s original justification for excluding fringe benefits was premised on an
understanding that when an employee was required to accept benefits to fulfill his
duties, that employee was not actually being compensated for services but was simply
accommodating the employer.27 This rationale came to be known as the “convenience
of the employer” doctrine.28 Many early applications of the doctrine involved employerprovided meals and lodgings,29 but the IRS often sought to justify other benefits based
on a similar connection to a taxpayer’s employment.30
The first reference to the convenience of the employer doctrine occurred in a
1919 IRS decision, which provided that “[b]oard and lodging furnished to seamen in
addition to their cash compensation is held to be supplied for the convenience of the
employer.”31 The value of these benefits was excluded from the taxpayer’s income.32
19.

Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167.

20. O.D. 265, 1919-1 C.B. 71; O.D. 514, 1920-2 C.B. 90.
21.

See Karla W. Simon, Fringe Benefits and Tax Reform: Historical Blunders and a Proposal for Structural
Change, 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. 871, 889 (1984).

22.

T.D. 2992, 1920-2 C.B. 76.

23.

O.D. 946, 1921-4 C.B. 110.

24.

Simon, supra note 21, at 879.

25.

Gazur, supra note 18, at 982; see also Simon, supra note 21, at 879.

26. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167; Simon, supra note 21, at 879.
27.

Comm’r v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 85 (1977); Simon, supra note 21, at 897.

28. Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 84.
29. See, e.g., O.D. 265, 1919-1 C.B. 71.
30. See, e.g., O. 1014, 1920-2 C.B. 88; O.D. 514, 1920-2 C.B. 90.
31.

O.D. 265.

32.

Id.
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While not explicitly referencing the doctrine by name, a second 1919 IRS decision
held that maintenance payments provided to Red Cross workers were taxable to the
extent that they exceeded the workers’ actual living expenses.33
At the time these rulings were promulgated, nothing in the statutory definition
of taxable income indicated that benefits provided for the convenience of the employer
were exempt from taxation.34 Nonetheless, these early determinations showed that
the IRS was not prepared to classify every employer-provided benefit as taxable
income. Some commentators subsequently suggested that these rulings were based
on an assumption that the employees “had to be present where they were, not because
they desired it but rather because there was no other way that the duties could be
performed.”35 If the benefits provided to these taxpayers were necessary for them to
perform their duties, the IRS likely considered the benefits to be no more than tools
of the trade, rather than compensation as such.
In 1920, the IRS modified the existing tax regulations to reflect the creation of
the doctrine, providing that:
When living quarters such as camps are furnished to employees for the
convenience of the employer, the ratable value need not be added to the cash
compensation of the employee, but where a person receives as compensation
for services rendered a salary and in addition thereto living quarters, the value
to such person of the quarters furnished constitutes income subject to tax. 36

That same year, the IRS expanded the convenience of the employer exclusion by ruling
that “supper money” provided to an employee working overtime hours “is considered as
being paid for the convenience of the employer and for that reason does not represent
taxable income to the employee.”37 Two additional facts from the supper money
determination are worth mentioning. First, the ruling addressed an employee “who
voluntarily performs extra labor for his employer.”38 Second, the exclusion was not
applied to actual in-kind benefits, but to cash given for a purportedly noncompensatory
purpose.39
Unsurprisingly, the IRS had a difficult time reconciling the differences between
these early decisions. The voluntary nature of overtime labor in the supper money
decision seems distinguishable from the factual scenarios presented in the 1919
decisions. In the seamen decision, the employee was provided in-kind benefits and,
based on the nature of his duties, was required to be on the ship to perform his
33.

O.D. 11, 1919-1 C.B. 66.

34. Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167; Lawrence Zelenak, Custom and the Rule of Law

in the Administration of the Income Tax, 62 Duke L.J. 829, 842–43 (2012).

35.

Simon, supra note 21, at 897.

36. T.D. 2992, 1920-2 C.B. 76.
37.

O.D. 514, 1920-2 C.B. 90.

38. Id.
39.

See id.
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work.40 Voluntarily performing extra labor, when an employee is presumably free to
reject working the extra hours, is hardly comparable to being forced to remain on a
ship to complete one’s duties. If the 1919 rulings were based on an understanding
that employer-provided benefits were necessary for the employees to complete their
duties, it was unclear how excess voluntary labor fits into this framework.
Convenience of the employer determinations expanded in 1920, but the IRS drew
no clear line between the seemingly distinct seamen and supper money decisions.
Rulings issued in 1921 further extended the doctrine to camp lodgings provided to
employees of the Indian Service (presently, the federal Bureau of Indian Affairs) so
long as it did not consider the right to use the lodging as part of the employees’
compensation,41 and to employees engaged in the fish canning industry “[w]here, from
the location and nature of the work, it is necessary that employees engaged in fishing
and canning be furnished with lodging and sustenance by the employer.”42
The divergent readings of the IRS’s determinations resulted in the development
of two variations of the convenience of the employer doctrine: the “employercharacterization” model and the “business-necessity” model. The employercharacterization model focused on whether the employer intended the benefit to be
considered compensation and ref lected the supper money exclusion.43 In Jones v.
United States, the court relied on this variation of the doctrine in holding that neither
the value of lodgings provided to an army officer nor a cash commutation for
subsistence provided in lieu of lodgings constituted taxable income.44 The Jones court
based its holding on “custom,” noting that congressionally appropriated sums were
considered distinct from compensation for other state employees (including judges),
and on the premise that providing lodging to an officer was a military necessity.45
The alternative model focused on the underlying facts and circumstances of the
taxpayer’s employment to determine whether the benefit was actually necessary for
the business to function properly, reflecting the seaman exclusion.46 The businessnecessity model found judicial support in Van Rosen v. Commissioner, a case presenting
facts similar to Jones but reaching the opposite result.47 Van Rosen was a civilian ship
captain employed by the army.48 While his ship was being repaired, he was given a
cash allowance to secure lodging.49 The court held that the cash constituted taxable
40. See O.D. 265, 1919-1 C.B. 71.
41.

O.D. 914, 1921-4 C.B. 85.

42.

O.D. 814, 1921-4 C.B. 84–85.

43.

See Comm’r v. Kowalski, 434 U.S. 77, 84–85 (1977).

44. 60 Ct. Cl. 552, 567–68 (1925).
45.

Id.

46. See Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 85; O.D. 265, 1919-1 C.B. 71.
47.

See 17 T.C. 834, 837 (1951).

48. Id. at 834.
49. Id. at 835.
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income because the benefit was not necessary for Van Rosen to perform his duties as
a ship captain.50
Additional cases and IRS publications in the 1950s did little to reduce taxpayer
confusion.51 In light of these conflicting doctrines and decisions, Congress enacted
§ 119 to establish when meals and lodging furnished by an employer can be excluded
from an employee’s taxable income.52 This provision embraced the business-necessity
model as the statutory convenience of the employer test.53 To eliminate any residual
doubts, the U.S. Supreme Court definitively interpreted § 119 as embracing this
view in Commissioner v. Kowalski.54
		

2. Health and Accident Insurance

A similar pattern of IRS pronouncement, followed by statutory codification,
characterizes one of the most costly and most controversial fringe benefits—namely,
employer-provided health and accident insurance for employees. In this circumstance,
there was no effort to cast this exclusion as something provided for the employer’s
convenience, at least as that concept had been understood to that point. Instead, the
origin of this benefit relates to World War II and the then-typical pattern of wartimeinduced wage and price inflation.55 With large numbers of workers taken off the
employment rolls to implement the war effort, those workers who remained available
for employment were in short supply and employers felt the need to increase wages in
light of the changed supply-and-demand dynamics.56
To prevent such wage increases, the U.S. government limited employers’ ability
to raise workers’ wages to reflect the new employment realities.57 Since wage increases
were thus limited, some employers began to provide health and accident insurance to
their employees.58 In what would become an incredibly pivotal decision for U.S.
health care, and for the American economy more generally, the federal government
went along with this rather transparent effort to evade the wage restrictions it had
imposed. To be sure, health insurance at that time was a relatively novel concept and
was fairly inexpensive. In any case, the IRS subsequently ruled that employees did
50. Id. at 838.
51.

See Kowalski, 434 U.S. at 84 (discussing the history of the convenience of the employer doctrine).

52.

Id. at 90–91 (citing H.R. Rep. No. 83-1337, at 18 (1954), S. Rep. No. 83-1622, at 19 (1954), reprinted in
1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 4649).

53.

Id. at 93.

54. Id. The Kowalski Court held that cash reimbursements paid to state highway patrol officers for lunches

while on duty were not excludible as meals provided by an employer. Id. at 95.

55.

See History of Health Insurance Benefits, Emp. Benefit Res. Inst. (Mar. 2002), http://www.ebri.org/
publications/facts/index.cfm?fa=0302fact.

56. Id.
57.

See David Blumenthal, Employer-Sponsored Health Insurance in the United States—Origins and Implications,
355 New Eng. J. Med. 82, 83 (2006).

58. Id.
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not need to include the value of health insurance premiums paid by their employers
in their taxable income.59
Nearly a decade after World War II, Congress codified this determination in
§ 106, which provides that gross income “does not include employer-provided
coverage under an accident or health plan.”60 Although the full ramifications of this
provision are beyond the scope of this article, this seemingly innocuous fringe benefit
tax exclusion led to the development of more comprehensive health insurance. After
all, the increased cost of health insurance that covers every check-up and influenza
vaccination receives tax-favored treatment when compared to increased wages that
would otherwise pay for such costs.61 Furthermore, the tax-favored treatment of
employer-provided health insurance led directly to the pervasive practice of U.S.
employees looking to their employers for health insurance62—a phenomenon that is
largely unique among developed economies.63 Not until the implementation of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,64 or ObamaCare, had any significant
effort been made to sever the connection between employment and health
insurance—a connection with far-reaching consequences for both domains.
		

3. Group-Term Life Insurance

The IRS’s early struggles to consistently apply a clearly defined test for the
convenience of the employer doctrine extended beyond meals and lodging into an
area that seems completely unrelated—namely, group-term life insurance. When the
IRS first considered the tax consequences of employer-provided group-term life
insurance premiums, it concluded that these payments were deductible for the
employer and taxable income for the employee.65 This conclusion was based on an
understanding that reasonable premiums are “clearly a legitimate expense of the
corporation, being in the nature of additional compensation to the employees.”66
In a 1920 Solicitor’s Law Opinion, the IRS changed positions, establishing that
employer-provided group-term life insurance was not part of an employee’s taxable

59.

Special Ruling, 433 Standard Fed. Tax Serv. (CCH), ¶ 6587 (Nov. 24, 1943).

60. I.R.C. § 106(a) (Westlaw 2010).
61.

See Richard L. Kaplan, Who’s Afraid of Personal Responsibility? Health Savings Accounts and the Future of
American Health Care, 36 McGeorge L. Rev. 535, 546–47 (2005).

62. Id. at 538–39.
63. See Karen Davis, Slowing the Growth of Health Care Costs—Learning from International Experience, 359

New Eng. J. Med. 1751, 1751 (2008) (“The United States spends twice per capita what other major
industrialized countries spend on health care but is the only one that fails to provide near-universal
health insurance coverage.”). See generally Robert Kuttner, Market-Based Failure—A Second Opinion on
U.S. Health Care Costs, 358 New Eng. J. Med. 549 (2008).

64. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
65.

O. 1014, 1920-2 C.B. 88.

66. Id.
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income.67 The IRS concluded that the only benefit an employee received under the
plan was “the feeling of contentment that provision has been made for dependents,”
as the dependents were the only ones to receive the monetary benefits of the plan.68
Interestingly, the IRS concluded that the payments were deductible to the corporation
as an “ordinary and necessary expense[]” because premiums are not compensation to
the employee “but an investment in increased efficiency” that lasts only while the
employee is employed.69 Although premiums for group-term life insurance thus
received favorable tax treatment, premiums for individual and group-permanent life
insurance did not.70
This position continued until it was codified in § 79 by the Revenue Act of
1964.71 In drafting § 79, Congress recognized the inequitable effect of excluding
group-term life insurance premiums while taxing premiums paid for other insurance
policies.72 Congress further rejected the IRS’s rationale for the exclusion, noting that
“the employee . . . receives a substantial economic benefit from this insurance
protection whether or not the policy for a specific year leads to a payment to his
beneficiary.” 73 Nonetheless, § 79 continues to exclude from taxation the cost of any
group-term life insurance provided by an employer to the extent that the face value
of such insurance does not exceed $50,000.74 The cost of any insurance over this
threshold is taxable to the employee.75
This peculiarly Solomonic resolution elides the notion that this fringe benefit has
any significant business rationale to the employer providing such insurance, especially
since the $50,000 threshold has not been adjusted for inflation in the half century
since its enactment.76 Indeed, many employees are unaware that this provision even
exists until they find additional income in their end-of-year tax statement representing
the employer’s premium cost for life insurance exceeding the $50,000 threshold. To
be sure, this insurance is not permanent and often ends when a worker’s employment

67.

Id.

68. Id.
69. Id. at 89; see also Lee v. United States, 219 F. Supp. 225, 229 (W.D.S.C. 1963) (distinguishing group-

term life insurance premiums from individual plans and noting that the former are an investment in
increased employee efficiency).

70. Lee, 219 F. Supp. at 229.
71.

Simon, supra note 21, at 905.

72. H.R. Rep. No. 88-749, pt. 2, at 1030 (1963).
73. Id. at 1064.
74.

I.R.C. § 79(a)(1) (Westlaw 2012).

75. Id.
76. Using the Consumer Price Index from the U.S. Department of Labor’s Bureau of Labor Statistics, the

$50,000 threshold would be approximately $376,000 adjusted through November 2013. U.S. Dep’t of
Labor, C.P.I. Inflation Calculator, Bureau Lab. Stat., http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl (last visited
Jan. 25, 2015).
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terminates,77 but until then, an employee can designate who will receive the insurance
proceeds upon the employee’s death.78 In other words, such insurance functions just
like term insurance that an employee might purchase on own initiative.
		

4. Transportation Passes and Holiday “Gifts”

Beyond the convenience of the employer doctrine, certain employer-provided
fringe benefits were excluded by the IRS on the rationale that they constituted gifts.
The concept of a “gift” in the early days of the IRC was more expansive before the
1986 statutory amendment declaring that gifts do not include “any amount transferred
by or for an employer to, or for the benefit of, an employee.” 79
In 1921, the IRS held that personal transportation passes provided to railroad
employees and their families were considered gifts when not required in the
employment contract.80 Nearly sixty years later, the tax court observed that treating
free railroad passes as anything other than additional compensation is “out of touch
with reality,”81 but the gift/compensation distinction has had strong traction with
taxpayers. Indeed, the railroad ruling would later be invoked to justify excluding free
airplane tickets provided to airline employees.82 The IRS continued to allow this
exclusion even after the U.S. Supreme Court narrowed the definition of a gift83 in
Commissioner v. Duberstein.84
In 1959, the IRS ruled that the value of a Christmas turkey, ham, or other
merchandise of similar nominal value would not constitute income or be subject to
wage withholding if the gifts were part of a general distribution to employees to
promote goodwill.85 Similar to the rationale in the original group-term life insurance
exclusion, the IRS held that the value of these items was deductible as an ordinary
and necessary business expense if distributed primarily for the business purpose of
promoting good relations among employees.86 Although the IRS paid particular
77.

See Treas. Reg. § 1.79-1(b) (Westlaw 2005) (providing that group-term life insurance may not provide a
“permanent benefit”).

78. Lauren Bikoff et al., U.S. Master Employee Benefits Guide 504 (2013 ed. 2013).
79. I.R.C. § 102(c)(1) (Westlaw 1986) (originally enacted as Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514,

§ 122(b), 100 Stat. 2085, 2110).

80. O.D. 946, 1921-4 C.B. 110 (“Personal transportation passes issued by a railroad company to its

employees and their families, to be used when not engaged on business for the company, and which are
not provided for in the contracts of employment, are considered gifts and the value thereof does not
constitute taxable income to the employees.”).

81.

Zelenak, supra note 34, at 843; see Zager v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 1009, 1014 n.3 (1979), action on dec., 198067 (Dec. 19, 1979), aff ’d sub nom. Martin v. Comm’r, 649 F.2d 1133 (5th Cir. 1981).

82. Zager, 72 T.C. at 1013–14; see Wendy Gerzog Shaller, The New Fringe Benefit Legislation: A Codification

of Historical Inequities, 34 Cath. U. L. Rev. 425, 429 (1985).

83. See Shaller, supra note 82, at 429.
84. 363 U.S. 278 (1960).
85. Rev. Rul. 59-58, 1959-1 C.B. 17.
86. Id.
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attention to the small amounts involved and the gift-like nature of the items, it was
careful to note that its ruling would not apply to “cash, gift certificates, and similar
items of readily convertible cash value, regardless of the amount involved.”87
After articulating this clear and unambiguous limit on the tax treatment of noncash holiday gifts, holiday gifts in the form of $25 and $15 gift cards were excluded
in Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. United States.88 In the spirit of Christmas, the court held
that the clear intention of the company was to provide gifts to its employees.89 The
court reasoned that the gift cards were no more than a means of promoting goodwill
among employees because they were relatively small in value and not readily
convertible into cash.90
Similarly, in Zager v. Commissioner, employer discounts provided to retail employees
were considered exempt from gross income on the same rationale.91 The Zager court
noted that these discounts “have traditionally been treated as non-taxable,
notwithstanding the familiar and oft-repeated statement that in considering what is to
be included in gross income Congress intended to use its power to the full extent.”92 It
appears that the IRS analogized this position from its earlier holiday cases, excluding
the discount from gross income when it was of a relatively small value provided to
promote employee health, goodwill, or efficiency.93
B. The Reforms of 1984

Even after Congress began codifying fringe benefit provisions in 1954, a large
number of nonstatutory fringe benefits continued to exist. Recognizing the confusion
generated from six decades of inconsistent rulings, the IRS felt that better guidance
was required for the treatment of nonstatutory fringe benefits. During 1975 and
1976, the IRS attempted to end confusion by formally recognizing certain
nonstatutory fringe benefits.94 But this effort met considerable criticism,95 and
Congress then enacted legislation to prohibit the issuance of final regulations relating
to fringe benefits96 while it sought to formulate the best way to treat these exclusions.97
87.

Id.

88. 200 F. Supp. 847, 850 (W.D. Mo. 1961).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91.

72 T.C. 1009, 1013–14 (1979).

92.

Id.

93.

Gazur, supra note 18, at 985.

94. Shaller, supra note 82, at 429–30.
95. Id.
96. Act of Oct. 7, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-427, § 1(a), 92 Stat. 996, 996.
97.

H.R. Rep. No. 98-432, at 286 (1983), reprinted in Bernard D. Reams, Jr., 3 Tax Reform 1984: A
Legislative History of the Tax Reform Act of 1984: The Law, Reports, Hearings, Debates
and Related Documents 3 (1985) [hereinafter Tax Reform History].
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Thirty years ago, Congress enacted its solution in the Deficit Reduction Act of
1984.98 Section 132 was designed to simplify the IRC, prevent tax benefits from
causing distortions in economic behavior, and improve the fairness and efficiency of
the tax system.99 To that end, Congress fashioned four general categories of tax-free
fringe benefits, but without any consistent underlying rationale. These categories are
now described briefly and then evaluated, after which, subsequently added exclusions
will be considered.
		

1. General Fringe Benefit Exclusions

One such category excludes benefits for which the employer incurs no “substantial
additional cost,”100 and the classic examples include using an otherwise empty hotel
room or flying in an otherwise unoccupied airline seat.101 A second general category
covers employee discounts within stipulated limits—namely, the gross profit
percentage for goods102 and 20% for services.103 Interestingly, these two fringe benefit
categories are subject to a nondiscrimination rule that precludes the application of
these exclusions to “highly compensated employees” unless the particular exclusion is
available “on substantially the same terms” to a broadly defined classification of
employees.104 The details implementing this rule are set forth in the Treasury
Regulations (“Regulations”),105 but the main point here is that this requirement
explicitly recognizes the importance of fairness issues in the fringe benefit area, as
noted earlier in this article.106
The other two general categories—namely, working condition and de minimis
benefits—speak directly to how fringe benefit exclusions often originated and to their
appropriate scope according to this article. Working condition fringes are benefits “that,
if the employee paid for [them], such payment would be allowable as a [trade or business]
deduction.”107 Benefits excludable under this provision include “property or services [that]
reasonably can be expected to occur in connection with the employee’s performance.”108
98. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 531(a)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 877–81 (adding I.R.C. § 132).
99. Tax Reform History, supra note 97, at 42.
100. I.R.C. § 132(a)(1) (Westlaw 2013).
101. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-2(a)(2) (Westlaw 1989).
102. I.R.C. § 132(a)(2), (c)(1)(A), (c)(2)(A)(i)–(ii).
103. Id. § 132(c)(1)(B).
104. Id. § 132(j)(1).
105. See Treas. Reg. § 1.132-8(a)(i)–(ii) (Westlaw 1989).
106. Finneran, supra note 10, at 199 n.11.
107. I.R.C. § 132(d).
108. Rules for the Federal Tax Treatment of Fringe Benefits: Hearing on H.R. 3525 Before the Subcommittee on

Select Revenue Measures of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 98th Cong. 60 (1983), reprinted in
Bernard Reams, Jr., 11 Tax Reform 1984: A Legislative History of the Tax Reform Act of
1984: The Law, Reports, Hearings, Debates and Related Documents (1985) (explaining H.R.
3525’s working condition fringe definition).
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Receipts of cash payments by an employer must be verified with adequate records,109 and
any amount unspent must be returned to the employer.110
Although the working condition fringe benefit exclusion does not employ the
convenience of the employer rubric, it embodies a correlative notion of businessnecessity by incorporating the “ordinary and necessary” standards that § 162 requires
for the deduction of “trade or business” expenses.111 In effect, this exclusion recognizes
that if an employer provides a benefit that the employee could otherwise deduct, the
cleanest administrative approach is to ignore the transaction entirely.112 Despite this
approach, some benefits—such as employer-provided outplacement counseling113 and
voluntary employee fishing trips114 —have been excluded under this provision.
The exclusion for de minimis fringe benefits is unassailably sensible. The law
should not bother with “any property or service the value of which is (after taking
into account the frequency with which similar fringes are provided by the employer
to the employer’s employees) so small as to make accounting for it unreasonable or
administratively impracticable.”115 Classic examples include free “coffee, doughnuts,
and soft drinks.”116 With that being said, the current Regulations exclude certain
benefits such as “occasional personal use of an employer’s copying machine”117 that
could easily be rendered accountable using modern technology.118
		

2. Evaluating the General Fringe Benefit Exclusions

Congress justified the preferential tax treatment of these fringe benefits by relying
on custom, administrative difficulties, and legitimate noncompensatory business
purposes.119 The House Report on the Deficit Reduction Act states that free
transportation passes and employee discounts were “long established” and had been
relied upon by taxpayers and the IRS for some time.120 Administrative difficulties in
keeping track of employee discounts and no-additional-cost services were also cited to

109. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-5(a)(1)(v)(B) (Westlaw 2010).
110. Id. § 1.132-5(a)(1)(v)(C).
111. I.R.C. § 162(a) (Westlaw 2011).
112. Gazur, supra note 18, at 1013.
113. Rev. Rul. 92-69, 1992-2 C.B. 51.
114. See Townsend Indus., Inc. v. United States, 342 F.3d 890, 891 (8th Cir. 2003).
115. I.R.C. § 132(e)(1) (Westlaw 2013).
116. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(e)(1) (Westlaw 1992).
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., Xerox Job Tracking Captures Data for Office Print Tracking, Xerox, http://www.consulting.xerox.

com/print-tracking/enus.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2015).

119. See Tax Reform History, supra note 97, at 286.
120. See id.
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justify exclusion,121 especially for airline passes.122 Additionally, Congress felt there was
a legitimate, noncompensatory business purpose justifying the qualified employee
discount and no-additional-cost service provisions. 123 By way of example, the
Committee Reports provided that “a retail clothing business will want its salespersons
to wear, when they deal with customers, the clothing which it seeks to sell to the
public.”124 To some congressional leaders, exclusions of travel passes to airline employees
and discounts to retail employees were considered two of the “most important
[exclusions] to many working taxpayers.”125 It is unclear who these “working taxpayers”
might be outside of the retail and airline industries.
Congress’s attempt to justify these exclusions through a business purpose is
reminiscent of the IRS’s early efforts to justify administrative exclusions based on
employer convenience.126 Applying different tests for employer convenience led to
inconsistent rulings that ultimately forced congressional intervention to reconcile the
discrepancies.127 The business purpose articulated here is also reminiscent of the
“increased efficiency” rationale offered by the IRS in its initial exclusion of group-term
life insurance.128 But, unlike traditional convenience of the employer determinations,
these exclusions are not necessary for an employer’s business to function.129
The administrative difficulties of reporting employee discounts and no-additionalcost services are also suspect. Even assuming that the recordkeeping burden is too
onerous for these benefits to be taxable—which is not a convincing argument given
the IRS’s ability to value prize money and gratuitous tips130 —administrative concerns
do not justify broadening the definition of an employee to include his parents, as is
the case with airline passes.131
		

3. Subsequently Added Exclusions

Section 132 has subsequently been amended to exclude additional benefits that are
even further afield from whatever rationale the 1984 reforms sought to implement.132
Less than a decade after those reforms were enacted, Congress decided to increase the
United States’ environmental consciousness by creating fringe benefit exclusions for
121. Shaller, supra note 82, at 430–31.
122. Id. at 436.
123. See Tax Reform History, supra note 97, at 286.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 1308.
126. See, e.g., O.D. 814, 1921-4 C.B. 84; O.D. 914, 1921-4 C.B. 85.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 71–90.
128. O. 1014, 1920-2 C.B. 88–89.
129. See Shaller, supra note 82, at 428.
130. See id. at 436–38.
131. I.R.C. § 132(h)(3) (Westlaw 2013).
132. See generally id. § 132 (originally enacted as Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494).

299

Change and Continuity in Fringe Benefit Taxation: Seeking Sense and Sensibility

employer-provided mass transit passes, employer-run commuter vehicles, and parking
near an employer’s premises133—even though subsidizing such parking would seem to
undercut efforts to reduce energy consumption.134 Nearly a decade after those additions
were made, employer-provided retirement planning services were added to the list of
exclusions,135 although the nondiscrimination rule that previously was restricted to
no-additional-cost services and employee discounts was extended to this particular
benefit.136 The most recent addition to this increasingly diverse collection of provisions
was added to assist those Americans who are affected by the closing of military bases.137
As a result, the barely coherent scheme of § 132 has become less so due to subsequent
legislative additions.
III.	Rethinking the Exclusion of Fringe Benefits

The tax reform effort of thirty years ago was not an effective temporizing solution.
It provided few convincing reasons for taxing some fringe benefits and not others, and
it failed to stem the proliferation of additional exclusions. It is time for a different
approach to this perennial problem. It is time to take seriously the IRC’s imperative to
tax compensation regardless of the form it takes, including most fringe benefits.138
Despite the enormous changes that have taken place during the century of the
federal income tax law’s existence, the IRS’s original effort to distinguish between
business-necessitated benefits that facilitate the enterprise of the employer and benefits
that substitute for wages remains sound. Accordingly, a comprehensive effort should be
undertaken to draw this line of demarcation as clearly as possible without regard to
historic “custom” and similar theoretical shortcuts. In this regard, the IRS’s 1984
approach should be renewed and applied with a presumption that all fringe benefits are
taxable unless they predominantly benefit the employer or are necessary to avoid
onerous recordkeeping. In other words, exclusions should be limited to those fringe
benefits that are necessary to complete employment tasks in line with the original
personal/employer-necessity distinction drawn by the IRS.139
Under this framework, primarily personal benefits would be included in income
while benefits that are necessary for an employee to complete an employer’s task are
excludable. Factors such as the value of the provided good or service and whether
readily available noncompensatory alternatives exist to accomplish the employer’s
133. Id. § 132(f)(1), amended by Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1911(b), 106 Stat. 2776,

3012–13.

134. See generally Jennifer L. Shoulberg, Pedaling Toward a More Equitable Tax-Ride for Cyclists, 55 St. Louis

U. L.J. 423 (2010).

135. I.R.C. § 132(m)(1), amended by Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L.

No. 107-16, § 665(b), 115 Stat. 38, 143.

136. Id. § 132(m)(2).
137. Id. § 132(n)(1), amended by Military Family Tax Relief Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-121, § 103(b), 117

Stat. 1335, 1337–38.

138. See generally id. § 132.
139. See, e.g., O.D. 265, 1919-1 C.B. 71; Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167.
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goals should be considered in making this determination. An employer’s assessment
that a particular benefit is necessary would not be controlling, and each case would
require an objective analysis of the underlying facts and circumstances.140 De minimis
items that are legitimately too difficult to administer would continue to be excluded.
The results of this approach would be more equitable and more efficient than the
current model, which eliminates nearly all of the fringe benefit exclusions that are
currently available. Eliminating these exclusions would simplify the IRC, further
easing the cost of taxpayer compliance. Applications of this approach to the fringe
benefits previously described now follow, beginning with health and accident
insurance, group-term life insurance, the specific exclusions of § 132, and finally,
meals and lodging.
A. Health and Accident Insurance

Tackling first the biggest elephant in the proverbial room, there is no inherent
reason for employer-provided health and accident insurance to be a tax-free fringe
benefit. Other than the obvious reality that employers need healthy workers, health
insurance is about as personal a benefit as one can imagine. The idea that employers
should design policy options and alternatives for a diverse workforce that has little in
common beyond their source of employment is both wrong-headed and dangerous.141
Employees may be single or married, healthy or not quite so healthy, smokers,
exercisers, food addicts, drug abusers, etc. These characteristics, and many others,
play important roles in determining the most appropriate health insurance that an
employee might prefer. The employer is not in the best position to assess the varying
preferences of its employees and would not have accepted this burden but for a policy
developed over seventy years ago to avoid wartime constraints on allowable pay
increases.142 No other developed economy assigns such a major role to employers in
securing health insurance coverage for its citizens. That an employer’s highest
prerogative in this context is cost minimization further underscores the poor fit that
health insurance has as a tax-free fringe benefit. On the proposed divide between
business-necessity and personal-expenditure surrogate, health insurance clearly falls
within the personal-expenditure category.
Though this article is about tax policy, a proposal to end the exclusion for health
insurance necessarily requires some non-tax exposition. It is worth noting, for
example, that eliminating the exclusion for health insurance would have additional
salutary benefits in dissolving the tie between employment and health insurance.
Losing one’s job would no longer mean losing one’s health insurance as well.
Another salutary benefit would be ending “job lock,” the phenomenon whereby
employees may stay with an employer longer than they would otherwise because they
140. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 670 F.2d 167, 169, 174 (Ct. Cl. 1982) (quoting Dole v. Comm’r, 43

T.C. 697, 706 (1965), aff ’d per curiam, 351 F.2d 308 (1st Cir. 1965)).

141. See Kaplan, supra note 61, at 536–37.
142. See supra notes 55–59 and accompanying text.
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or their families need the health insurance their employer provides.143 When President
Obama’s health reform law is fully implemented, employees will be able to secure
health insurance regardless of health status.144 Indeed, preexisting conditions that
preclude health insurance coverage have historically been a major benefit of securing
health insurance through an employer. But if employees can obtain such insurance
regardless of their medical history, there is less reason to preserve a link between
employment and health insurance that was never deliberately fashioned.
Severing the employment-insurance linkage would also eliminate many of the
intrusive efforts of some employers to monitor employees’ health and personal habits
regarding diet, exercise, smoking, and other non-work related behaviors.145 If an
employer pays for health insurance, the employer has a facially legitimate claim to
knowing about the factors that determine its costs. A fortiori, if health insurance is
not an employer-provided benefit, these inherently personal aspects of an employee’s
life should be off-limits to employers. Finally, terminating health insurance as a taxfree fringe benefit would eliminate the exclusion’s present incentive to have expensive
first-dollar coverage. Instead, Americans would approach health insurance as they
do home and automobile insurance: buy insurance to cover large unanticipated
expenses but pay for smaller, more predictable expenditures directly.146 The present
tax exclusion encourages the opposite approach by substituting tax-free health
insurance for taxable compensation. Quite apart from tax policy reasons, the fringe
benefit exclusion for employer-provided health insurance should be eliminated as
part of a general rationalization of how Americans finance their health care costs.
B. Group-Term Life Insurance

As noted previously, the enactment of § 79 with its unadjusted $50,000 limitation
dissolved any coherent rationale for excluding employer-provided group-term life
insurance.147 Such insurance provides almost exclusively personal benefits. It does
not enhance, let alone facilitate, an employee’s ability to accomplish his assigned
duties. Life insurance is widely available to the public and many employees,
particularly those without family responsibilities, who might forgo such coverage if
their employer did not provide such insurance. Applying the business-necessity

143. See David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2 Yale J.

Health Pol’y L. & Ethics 23, 28 (2001).

144. 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-3(a) (Westlaw 2011), amended by Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,

Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1201(2)(A), 124 Stat. 119, 154 (2010).

145. See, e.g., Howard M. Leichter, “Evil Habits” and “Personal Choices”: Assigning Responsibility for Health in

the 20th Century, 81 Milbank Q. 603, 609 (2003) (noting that some employers decline to hire smokers
while others increase cost-sharing for overweight employees); Kris Maher, Companies are Closing Doors
on Job Applicants Who Smoke, Wall St. J. (Dec. 21, 2004, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/
articles/SB110358443336005295.

146. See Kaplan, supra note 61, at 566–67.
147. See supra notes 71–78 and accompanying text.
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versus personal framework, group-term life insurance should not be a tax-free fringe
benefit, even to the limited extent that it is today.
C. No-Additional-Cost Services and Employee Discounts

The current exclusions for no-additional-cost services and employee discounts
should be eliminated as well. These benefits are not necessary for an employee to
complete his appointed tasks. To think that a retail worker cannot stock shelves,
check out customers, or otherwise perform his duties without an employee discount
is preposterous. Similarly, airline employees could continue to maintain airplanes,
attend to customers, and fly airplanes without off-duty passes for free flights. Indeed,
the availability of airline passes to family members,148 including parents of
employees,149 makes any business-necessity claim laughable on its face. These benefits
quite simply represent compensation in another form and should be taxed as such.
Eliminating the present exclusions for them would have the additional administrative
benefit of no longer needing to apply the inherently ambiguous nondiscrimination
test150 because that test pertains primarily to the no-additional-cost services and
employee discount fringe benefit provisions.151
Despite the airline industry’s original administrative concerns, web-based
solutions and other services now provide deals on last-minute flights, which make
determining the fair market value of these flights far easier than when the provision
was first enacted.152 Alternatively, the value of these flights could be determined in
the same way as tips or prizes.153 The bottom line is that these benefits no longer
make sense under either an employer-necessity or administrative rationale.
D. Working Condition and De Minimis Fringes

Under an employer’s business-necessity test, working condition fringe benefits
would continue to be excludible as long as they are necessary for employees to fulfill
their duties. Business use of company-provided transportation, as well as office
equipment and other tools of the modern workplace such as cell phones and similar
items, would therefore experience no change in tax treatment—assuming that
appropriate documentation of such business use is undertaken. After all, such
documentation is presently required for businesses to deduct travel and related
148. I.R.C. § 132(h)(2) (Westlaw 2013).
149. Id. § 132(h)(3). See generally Joel S. Newman, Fly Me, Fly My Mother, 35 Tax Notes 291 (1987), for a

comprehensive and insightful history of this extension.

150. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-8(d) (Westlaw 1989).
151. Id.; I.R.C. § 132(a)(1)–(2), (j)(1).
152. Services like Priceline.com and Expedia claim to offer the best deals on “last minute” airfare by

comparing the prices of flights offered across multiple airlines. See, e.g., Priceline.com, http://www.
priceline.com (last visited Jan. 25, 2015); Expedia, http://www.expedia.com/Flights#tab-deals_item_2
(last visited Jan. 25, 2015).

153. See Shaller, supra note 82, at 436–38.
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costs,154 so this requirement is neither burdensome nor unprecedented. Other
benefits, such as employer-provided outplacement services and fishing trips, however,
would not meet the new standard. While these services may be tangentially related
to employment, they are not necessary for an employee to perform his job. These
examples show that as long as any fringe benefits are tax-free, the necessity for
careful line-drawing will not completely disappear—but at least its problematic scope
can be minimized.
Similarly, de minimis fringe benefits would continue to be excludible, but only to
the extent that there are genuine administrative difficulties in accounting for these
benefits. This article does not propose changing the present statutory de minimis
standard, but it insists on a stricter application of that standard. Employers should
not have to bear excessive costs to comply with the IRC, but given the possibility of
under-the-radar abuse, close monitoring is certainly appropriate. Employers,
moreover, can always decide that the effort to provide these benefits is not worth the
hassle and inconvenience, and provide cash remuneration instead.
Under this article’s framework, the exclusions currently allowed in the Regulations
for overtime meals, meal money, or local transportation155 would be eliminated.
Providing cash to employees for these items can easily be accounted for, especially via
electronic media such as debit cards and similar prepaid mechanisms. Moreover, the
supper money ruling156 that undergirds the exclusion in the current Regulations
involved an employee who voluntarily worked overtime. In an era when work hours
are increasingly flexible, there is little justification for this exclusion to continue.
E. Transportation Expenditures and Retirement Planning

The fringe benefit exclusions for transportation costs and retirement planning
reflect laudable non-tax policy objectives but have no place in the business-necessity
approach to this area. These provisions encourage employers to subsidize all types of
commuting expenses from mass transit157 to special “commuter highway vehicles”158
that may carry as few as six passengers (excluding the driver)159 to parking for
individual passenger automobiles “on or near the business premises of the employer.”160
Commuting expenses have long been recognized as personal expenditures that
cannot be deducted161 and are classified as nondeductible “personal, living, or family
154. I.R.C. § 274(d) (Westlaw 2005).
155. Treas. Reg. § 1.132-6(d)(2) (Westlaw 1992).
156. O.D. 514, 1920-2 C.B. 90.
157. I.R.C. § 132(f)(1)(B), (f)(5)(A)(i) (Westlaw 2013).
158. Id. § 132(f)(1)(A), (f)(5)(B).
159. Id. § 132(f)(5)(B)(i). In addition, at least 80% of the mileage of such vehicles must “be reasonably

expected” to be transporting employees between their homes and their workplace on trips during which
employees occupy at least half of the “adult seating capacity” of the vehicle. Id. § 132(f)(5)(B)(ii).

160. Id. § 132(f)(1)(C), (f)(5)(C).
161. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(e) (Westlaw 1960).
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expenses.”162 As the applicable Regulations provide, “[t]he taxpayer’s costs of
commuting to his place of business or employment are personal expenses.”163 In light
of the inherently personal character of such expenses, the transportation fringe
benefit provisions should be repealed in their entirety.
The present exclusion for retirement planning services164 is equally problematic.
Like transportation costs, expenses for retirement planning are not necessary for an
employee to complete his duties. Indeed, retirement planning is explicitly about
leaving the compensated workplace rather than fulfilling one’s responsibilities while
employed. For that reason alone, this exclusion should be repealed. Moreover, the
present exclusion limits its benefits to “retirement planning advice or information”165
and does not include other critical planning services such as “tax preparation,
accounting, legal, or brokerage services.”166 It is difficult to discern any important
distinction between the services that may be provided on a tax-favored basis and
those that may not because all such services are inherently personal and are for the
benefit of the employee rather than the employer. Furthermore, retirement planning
is a major growth industry and there is no shortage of willing vendors to provide
these services to any employee who wants them.167 Inasmuch as these fringe benefits
clearly substitute for expenditures that employees would make on their own, they
should be taxable.
F. Meals and Lodging

This article ends where it began, with meals and lodging provided for the
convenience of the employer, as codified in § 119. The proposed fringe benefit
framework, however, would return this provision to its roots and allow the exclusion
only when employer-provided meals and lodging are necessary for an employee to
complete his duties. It would also require more than a “substantial noncompensatory
business reason” for the provision of meals as articulated in the current Regulations.168
The definition of employee would also be limited to individuals currently working
for the employer, removing existing exclusions for spouses and dependents.169 These
162. I.R.C. § 262(a) (Westlaw 1988).
163. Treas. Reg. § 1.262-1(b)(5) (Westlaw 1972).
164. I.R.C. § 132(m)(1).
165. Id.
166. Internal Revenue Serv., supra note 1, at 6.
167. See, e.g., Hilary Johnson, Next Hot Industry? Retirement Planning, Inv. News (Jan. 10, 2010, 12:01 AM),

http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20100110/REG/301109994#; Occupational Outlook Handbook:
Personal Financial Advisors, U.S. Dep’t Lab. Bureau Lab. Stat., http://www.bls.gov/ooh/business-andfinancial/personal-financial-advisors.htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2015) (describing the projected growth of
personal financial advisors as “much faster than average”). Indeed, Kiplinger publishes Retirement
Report, a monthly publication that is devoted exclusively to retirement planning. Kiplinger’s Retirement
Report, Kiplinger, https://www.kiplinger.com/store/krr (last visited Jan. 25, 2015).

168. Treas. Reg. § 1.119-1(a)(2)(i) (Westlaw 1985).
169. I.R.C. § 119(a) (Westlaw 1998).
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restrictions reduce the likelihood that employer-provided lodging will simply be
compensation in disguise.
What about those art museum directors living in multimillion dollar homes at
their employer’s expense while not recognizing any economic benefit from these
arrangements? The museums in question claim that expensive lodging is necessary for
their directors to entertain guests and receive donations, but it is not clear why lodging
is required for this important job function. After all, would potential donors not be
equally inclined to donate to the museum while being feted in the museum that they
are being asked to support? Such a reasonable, noncompensatory alternative is just as
viable and likely to be just as effective. Indeed, a 2010 survey by the Association of
Art Museum Directors found that only 14% of its member organizations offered free
housing to their executives, and at least one commentator believes that these benefits
are not eligible for exclusion under the law as it stands today.170 Employer-provided
lodging for art museum executives should be included in these executives’ gross
income, absent a very clear showing of business necessity.
IV. Conclusion

From the earliest days of the income tax system, Congress and the IRS have
struggled to create a sensible framework for the treatment of fringe benefits.
Springing from a natural impulse to not tax employees on economic benefits that
employers provide for their own business purposes, the development of tax-free
fringe benefits has metastasized to encompass a wide range of increasingly personal
services. Indeed, these benefits usually have little, if anything, to do with
accomplishing the objectives of the employer and everything to do with maximizing
the potential for tax-free wage substitutes.
This article advocates a return to first principles to clear out the Augean Stable
of fringe benefits and confine the scope of tax-free emoluments to those provided by
employers pursuant to the exigencies and requirements of their business. No longer
should health insurance, life insurance, employee discounts, airline passes, commuting
expenses, and retirement planning services receive tax-free treatment simply because
an employer is the nominal purchaser of items that employees could acquire on their
own. Under this framework, the IRC would achieve significant simplification and be
able to start its second century unencumbered by provisions that bedevil rationalization
and complicate administrability at every turn. In addition, this approach would
generate substantial revenue, increase fairness between taxpayers, and provide greater
economic efficiency—a tough combination to beat.

170. See Zhao, supra note 12, at 429, 447–48.
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